On July 20, economist Zhao Jian stated that the two core indicators for judging a bull market—trading volume and profit-making effect—are currently severely distorted. First, regarding trading volume, the average daily trading volume of A-shares remains above 1.2 trillion yuan, with several days even exceeding 3 trillion yuan, but there is significant inflation in these figures; data from 2026 shows that quantitative trading accounts for 36.8% of the total trading volume of A-shares, with some trading days exceeding 40%. Next, concerning the profit-making effect, only 32% of the 5,528 stocks in the market rose in the first half of the year, meaning nearly 70% of stocks declined. When the market is supported only by a few AI computing stocks while the vast majority of investors are losing money, this is no longer a healthy bull market but a typical 'structural bubble.' At the retail investor level, the data is alarming. As of late June 2026, a joint sampling by the China Securities Association and leading brokerages showed that the loss ratio among active retail accounts in A-shares is as high as 79%-82%, with only 19%-21% of accounts making a profit. The traditional pattern of 'seven losses, two breakevens, and one profit' has been completely rewritten to 'eight losses, one breakeven, and one profit.' The average return for retail investors in the first half of the year was -23.6%, with an average floating loss of about 21,000 yuan and a median return of -25%. Retail investors with less than 100,000 yuan faced a loss rate of 98%-99%, nearly a total wipeout. Zhao Jian called for the policy level to immediately, decisively, and beyond expectations implement more aggressive market rescue policies than those of 924: the central bank should directly provide liquidity, increasing the scale of securities swaps from 500 billion to 2 trillion yuan or even higher, clearly indicating an 'unlimited' support intention; temporarily suspend IPOs and refinancing; urgently introduce measures to restrict high-frequency trading, increase trading costs, and suspend algorithmic trading; the Central Huijin Investment should clarify its positioning as a 'stabilization fund,' buying in at any cost during market panic to convey a 'national bottom' signal; simultaneously launch policies for real estate acquisition, reduce mortgage rates, and fully lift purchase restrictions to cut off the negative feedback of 'dual blows' from stocks and real estate; and substantially raise the upper limit for pension and insurance fund market participation, providing tax incentives to stabilize market valuation centers with 'long money.'